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Anxiety about ambiguous warfare and ‘hybridity’ is all the rage. But the rapidly 
proliferating literature on ‘grey’, ‘hybrid’ and ‘non-linear warfare’ is confused and 
references a bewildering range of military, political and economic developments 
associated with the changing nature of war over several decades.1 The proliferation 
of terms emphasizes that conceptual clarity is in short supply, and this elasticity 
ultimately obscures more than it explains.2 We argue that this lack of clarity turns 
upon the paradoxical nature of covert action. Covert action by definition seeks to 
change things and often leaves some sort of a trail. Although some have remarked 
on the varying degrees of exposure associated with hybrid warfare, little system-
atic analysis exists of the role of visibility and acknowledgement.3 We therefore 
seek to relocate the debate within a wide-ranging analysis of covert action which, 
on closer inspection, was often hardly covert at all. We unpack ideas surrounding 
secrecy to challenge assumptions about covert action and offer broader insights 
into contemporary interventionism.
For hundreds of years, states have sought to intervene in the affairs of others 
in a deniable manner. Since the professionalization of intelligence services in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, this behaviour has become known as 
covert action: commonly understood as activity to influence events in a plausibly 
deniable manner. Indeed, the concept of plausible deniability—some have gone 
as far as to call it a doctrine4—is central to understandings of covert action both 
academically and in practice. Yet plausible deniability has rarely been subjected 
* The authors are grateful to Andrew Mumford, Bettina Renz and Michael Poznansky for reading earlier drafts 
of this article. They are also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their suggestions and to the AHRC and 
the Leverhulme Trust for providing funding.
1 Typically, one recent text tells us that ‘the term “hybrid warfare” encompasses conventional warfare, irregular 
warfare, cyberwarfare, insurgency, criminality, economic blackmail, ethnic warfare, “lawfare,” and the appli-
cation of low-cost but effective technologies to thwart high-cost technologically advanced forces’: Douglas 
Lovelace, ed., Hybrid warfare and the gray zone threat (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. xi.
2 If there is an emerging scholarly consensus, it focuses upon the rather simplistic observation that ambiguous 
warfare is not new. Scholars arguing this include Bettina Renz, ‘Russia and “hybrid warfare”’, Contemporary 
Politics 22: 3, 2016, pp. 283–300; Mark Galeotti, ‘Hybrid, ambiguous and non-linear? How new is Russia’s 
“new way of war”?’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 27: 2, 2016, pp. 282–301; Alexander Lanoszka, ‘Russian hybrid 
warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe’, International Affairs 92: 1, Jan. 2016, pp. 175–95. 
3 Rod Thornton, ‘The changing nature of modern warfare: responding to Russian information warfare’, RUSI 
Journal 160: 4, 2015, pp. 40–48; Galeotti, ‘Hybrid, ambiguous and non-linear?’.
4 Thomas C. Ellington, ‘Won’t get fooled again: the paranoid style in the national security state’, Government 
and Opposition 38: 4, 2003, pp. 436–55.
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to critical analysis.5 It has instead almost become received wisdom.6 In reality, 
plausible deniability barely existed even in its supposed heyday and certainly has 
little place in the twenty-first century.
The orthodox consensus assumes that states engage in covert action when they 
can plausibly deny sponsorship. The execution of the act itself may not neces-
sarily be secret—assassinations, for example, involve someone visibly dying—but 
the sponsorship thereof is hidden both during and after the event. States must be 
able to deny involvement, and in a plausible or believable manner. This portrayal 
creates a conceptually neat but monodimensional understanding of covert action, 
in which secrecy is both binary and assumed. For some covert actions, it may well 
be the case that sponsorship remained secret from all except the sponsoring state. 
Indeed, certain operations undoubtedly have not yet surfaced for this very reason, 
and it is important to be aware of such ‘unknowns’ when discussing covert actions. 
However, many covert actions are an open secret: implausibly deniable. The CIA’s 
failed attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, together with 
large-scale paramilitary operations in Laos, Angola and Afghanistan, spring to mind 
as obvious examples where denials lacked plausibility. More recently, the Kremlin 
initially denied intervention in Ukraine in 2014 and still denies interference in the 
2016 US presidential election. In both cases, the denials rang hollow. Yet these opera-
tions did not fall outside the boundaries of covert action; nor did their lack of secrecy 
necessarily constitute a failure of covert action (although in the case of the Bay of 
Pigs it clearly did). This observation problematizes the role of plausible deniability as 
integral to covert action. One might counter that the existence of hitherto unknown 
covert actions, which need not be denied, undermines this argument; however, 
given that many supposedly successful covert actions (encompassing both influence 
and paramilitary operations) lacked secrecy, there are certainly grounds to question 
assumptions surrounding plausible deniability in covert action. 
To address this issue, we consider four questions: (1) What is plausible deniability 
and how does the concept hold up in practice? (2) What degrees of visibility and 
acknowledgement actually exist? (3) Why do leaders use covert action if some 
exposure is likely, and does it have coercive value? (4) How does implausible 
deniability in covert action connect to the recent debate over hybrid warfare? This 
article begins by considering orthodox conceptualizations of plausible deniability, 
and secret interventionism more broadly, within the existing literature. It then 
interrogates the role and reality of plausible deniability in covert action, offering 
a more complex conceptualization in the process. Finally, it develops a logic 
underpinning implausible deniability, recognizing the value of covert action both 
as a communicative tool and in creating and exploiting strategic ambiguity. 
5 Discussions have hitherto focused on specific historic episodes or issues of US national security law: Klaas Voß, 
‘Plausibly deniable: mercenaries in US covert interventions during the Cold War, 1964–1987’, Cold War History 
16: 1, 2016, pp. 37–60; Jennifer D. Kibbe, ‘Conducting shadow wars’, Journal of National Security Law and Policy 
5: 2, 2011, pp. 373–92; Marcus Eyth, ‘The CIA and covert operations: to disclose or not to disclose—that is 
the question’, Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 17: 1, 2002, pp. 45–72.
6 For an exception see Gregory Treverton, Covert action: the CIA and the limits of American intervention in the post-
war world (New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 10–11. He recognizes that covert action became increasingly 
overt in the 1980s.
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In the course of this analysis, we advance three arguments. First, plausible 
deniability is surprisingly poorly conceptualized in both academic discourse and 
political practice. This generates a misleadingly simplistic view of the nature and 
effects of covert action as a form of state interaction. In reality, a spectrum of 
attribution and exposure exists since covert action has multiple audiences, both 
internal and external. Second, although cases of plausibly deniable covert action 
exist—including some which have yet to come to light—the concept has long been 
flimsy, especially regarding paramilitary operations. This is even more the case 
today, for changes in the nature of mass media and the proliferation of electronic 
whistleblowing have increased implausible deniability. Both these developments 
challenge state secrecy while blurring boundaries between overt and covert, public 
and private, even truth and fiction. Implausible deniability is also linked to the 
growth of special forces and private military actors which have further increased 
the grey space between secrecy and visibility. 
Third, we argue that implausible deniability does not spell the end of covert 
action. Indeed, political leaders wish to have their cake and eat it, avoiding consti-
tutional accountability for risky operations while harnessing the benefits of open 
secrecy. Implausible deniability allows them to communicate resolve, exploit 
ambiguity and even ‘hang tough’ by boasting about deploying special forces. As 
early as 1962, President Kennedy was astounded to find that his approval rating 
soared to 82 per cent in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco simply because it made 
him look action-orientated.7 Ultimately, we advance a new understanding of 
covert action, moving away from the flawed idea of plausible deniability towards 
that of unacknowledged activity. Indeed, we suggest that much of the fashion-
able debate about the newness of hybrid war labours under a misapprehension. 
It revolves around the nature and prominence of covert action as much as any 
innovative operational means.
Conceptualizing plausible deniability
Taking their lead from US executive orders and legislative statutes, scholars 
have long referred to ‘plausible deniability’ when defining covert action. They 
have paid less attention to the phrase itself, interpreting ‘plausible deniability’ in 
myriad ways. Consequently, it lacks a clear conceptual grounding in the existing 
discourse. For some, it is simply an informal ‘buzzword’.8 For others, it amounts to 
a doctrine or ‘so-called doctrine’.9 For many, it is simply an ‘overarching  objective’ 
tying covert operations together.10 
7 David M. Barrett, The CIA and Congress: the untold story from Truman to Kennedy (Lawrence, KS: University Press 
of Kansas, 2005) p. 450.
8 Eyth, ‘The CIA and covert operations’, p. 54.
9 See John A. Radsan, ‘An overt turn on covert action’, St Louis University School of Law 53: 485, 2009, p. 520; 
Loch Johnson, National security intelligence (Cambridge: Polity, 2017), p. 86. The Church Committee of 1975 
saw it as a ‘so-called’ doctrine: see United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Senate (Washington DC, 20 Nov. 1975), vol. 2B, Covert action as a vehicle 
for foreign policy implementation, p. 11.
10 See Michael Joseph and Michael Poznansky, ‘Media technology, covert action, and the politics of exposure’, 
Journal of Peace Research, publ. online 16 Nov. 2017, DOI: 10.1177/0022343317731508, p. 3.
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Some scholars see plausible deniability as functioning at the international 
level: to allow a state to deny involvement in a certain act. Others locate it at the 
domestic level: to allow senior officials—and ultimately the premier—to deny 
personal knowledge and instead punish so-called ‘rogue elephants’ for transgres-
sion if the covert action is discovered.11 Gregory Treverton, who served on the 
first Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and penned the pioneering academic 
study of covert action in the late 1980s, links the two levels by noting that early 
covert action was designed to ‘enable the US government to argue plausibly that 
it, and failing that, at least the President, had not been involved’.12 
The time-frame of plausible deniability is equally confused. Most definitions 
do not consider how long sponsorship should remain hidden after an operation 
in order for it to qualify as successful—or even to qualify as covert action at 
all.13 This is problematic, for it raises unanswered questions about the purpose 
of deniability, alongside when and why leaders admit involvement. It also risks 
blurring lines with deception and special military operations, where secrecy has 
an operational shelf-life.14 As a British cabinet secretary lamented after the Second 
World War, sponsorship of covert operations in peacetime had to remain deniable 
for far longer; deniability now necessitated going beyond the short-term wartime 
requirement of merely protecting agents.15
Some writers advance the improbable idea of ‘silent warfare’ or ‘secret armies’.16 
More sophisticated attempts to discuss plausible deniability conflate visibility with 
acknowledgement. Johnson and Wirtz, for example, note that the role of the 
sponsor ‘is neither apparent nor publicly acknowledged’.17 This seems too idealistic 
and binary, for sponsorship can be apparent but not acknowledged. Perhaps this is 
redolent of the unrealistic expectations that some high-level policy-makers enter-
tain when considering covert action. Either way, it all amounts to a rather vague 
term too often used casually. As Admiral John Poindexter, National Security 
Advisor to President Reagan, put it during the Iran–Contra hearings of 1987: 
plausible deniability is ‘simply a concept’ and ‘open to interpretation’.18 
11 For Radsan, a former CIA assistant counsel, the sense is largely domestic: plausible deniability hinges on 
restricted congressional notice, thereby allowing the president to deny knowledge. See Radsan, ‘An overt 
turn on covert action’, pp. 520–22. See also Johnson, National security intelligence, p. 86. Daugherty emphasizes 
the international, arguing that since Truman, presidents have sought to limit knowledge in order to ‘maintain 
plausible deniability of US government involvement in case of public exposure or compromise’: William 
Daugherty, Executive secrets: covert action and the presidency (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 
p.  93.
12 Treverton, Covert action, p. 5.
13 Daugherty, for example, notes simply that the ‘covert aspect is that the sponsor … remains hidden’. See Execu-
tive secrets, p. 13. Treverton notes that because of the inherent paradox of secret operations in an open society, 
covert actions eventually become public sooner or later. See Covert action, pp. 3–4.
14 On deception and the limited time-span of secrecy, see J. Bowyer-Bell, ‘Toward a theory of deception’, Inter-
national Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16: 2, 2003, pp. 244–79.
15 Rory Cormac, Disrupt and deny: spies, special forces, and the secret pursuit of British foreign policy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), p. 14.
16 Abram N. Shulsky and Gary James Schmitt, Silent warfare: understanding the world of intelligence (Washington DC: 
Potomac, 2002); Mark Mazzetti, The way of the knife: the CIA, a secret army, and a war at the ends of the earth (New 
York: Penguin, 2014).
17 Loch Johnson and James Wirtz, ‘Covert action’, in Johnson and Wirtz, eds, Intelligence: the secret world of spies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 225 (emphasis added). 
18 James Schwartz, ‘Plausible deniability’, Washington Post, 22 July 1987.
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This uncertainty is problematic, both analytically and practically. Domes-
tically, it blurs accountability, the identity of actors and the constitutional 
implications. Internationally, it creates the misleading assumption that target 
states lack awareness of the hidden hand behind successful operations. As 
we shall see, covert action is multidimensional, with varying audiences and 
degrees of exposure. In many cases, the target is aware of the perpetrator—
indeed, quite often the effectiveness of covert action depends on this aware-
ness to achieve a degree of coercion that lies somewhere between diplomacy 
and conventional force. For example, when explaining the purpose of exten-
sive Cold War covert actions against Indonesia, the CIA’s Deputy Director for 
Plans, Frank Wisner, remarked: ‘I think it’s time we held [President] Sukarno’s 
feet to the fire.’19
More broadly, much of the International Relations (IR) literature offers a 
simplistic view of secrecy. It does not treat covert action in a sophisticated manner, 
but takes plausible deniability at face value. It considers secrecy/ transparency in 
a more or less binary manner, sees exposure as negative, and offers little consid-
eration of the paradoxical nature of covert action—or indeed of covert action 
at all.20 The vast literature on signalling, for example, has largely ignored the 
value of covert communication, focusing instead on public threat as a means 
of coercion or signalling resolve.21 A rare exception is Austin Carson’s work on 
secrecy and non-escalation which, although limited to ‘covert’ warfare, recognizes 
that exposure is not dichotomous and that violent action conducted within the 
twilight world of quasi-secrecy can prevent escalation.22 
It is, of course, in paramilitary covert actions—or ‘secret wars’—that plausible 
deniability has long been paper-thin. However, like hybrid warfare, covert action 
is also poorly integrated into the literature on proxy warfare. Writing on covert 
action does implicitly incorporate proxy wars, such as those in 1980s  Afghanistan, 
under the banner of paramilitary operations, but does little to address the obviously 
implausible deniability of those covert actions. Conversely, much of the literature 
on proxy warfare, again like that on hybrid warfare, struggles with the idea of covert 
action. Authors have acknowledged a ‘sponsor’s dilemma’, whereby it is difficult 
for those sponsoring proxies to do so openly for fear of breaching the principle of 
19 Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, Feet to the fire: CIA covert action in Indonesia, 1957–1958 (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 1999).
20 Covert action has only recently featured in the IR literature. Most recently, Joseph and Poznansky offer a 
sophisticated discussion of exposure costs but treat secrecy as more or less binary. See Joseph and Poznansky, 
‘Media technology, covert action, and the politics of exposure’. This is consistent with the few discussions 
of covert action in relation to democratic peace theory. See Alexander Downes and Mary L. Lilley, ‘Overt 
peace, covert war? Covert intervention and the democratic peace’, Security Studies 19: 2, 2010, pp. 266–306; 
Michael Poznansky, ‘Stasis or decay? Reconciling covert war and the democratic peace’, International Studies 
Quarterly 59: 4, 2015, pp. 815–26; Sebastian Rosato, ‘The flawed logic of democratic peace theory’, American 
Political Science Review 97: 4, 2003, pp. 585–602.
21 Most famously, see Thomas Schelling, The strategy of conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1960); for discussion of the literature, see Austin Carson and Keren Yarhi-Milo, ‘Covert communication: the 
intelligibility and credibility of signaling in secret’, Security Studies 26: 1, 2017, pp. 128–9.
22 See Austin Carson, ‘Facing off and saving face: covert intervention and escalation management in the Korean 
War’, International Organization 70: 1, 2016, pp. 103–31; also Carson and Yarhi-Milo, ‘Covert communication’, 
pp. 124–56.
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non-interference.23 Yet disagreement exists over the relationship between proxy 
warfare and covert action. Andrew Mumford argues that the two are distinct 
on the basis that covert action requires intelligence or special forces personnel 
on the ground in the target country, whereas proxy warfare is conducted more 
indirectly.24 Others believe proxy warfare can be a (para)military form of covert 
action—nevertheless, all conceptualize exposure in binary terms.25
Examination of the literature reveals two fault-lines, concerning respectively 
the target and the credibility of the deception. Both are important, but the litera-
ture offers one fairly consistent assumption: that covert action requires plausible 
deniability for an unspecified length of time which, in turn, requires secrecy 
from its target audience. We argue, by contrast, that not all covert actions are 
plausibly deniable and that exposure—if unacknowledged—is not necessarily 
counter productive. Plausibility operates on a continuum. Action which is neither 
acknowledged nor apparent is plausibly deniable covert action. Despite this 
forming the orthodox view, many operations traditionally considered successful 
are actually apparent but not acknowledged: that is, implausibly deniable. The 
historical prevalence of this phenomenon is reinforced as archives of the former 
Soviet Bloc open up and scholars realize that many ‘secret’ western operations were 
in fact known to Soviet intelligence.26 Ultimately, the complexity of plausible 
deniability should be embraced; otherwise, as demonstrated above, we are left 
with a misleading and impoverished concept. 
The myth of plausible deniability
The concept of plausible deniability in its classic form is synonymous with 
American Cold War traditions. It can be traced back to NSC10/2, enunciated 
in 1948, a year after the creation of the CIA. In this document, the US National 
Security Council defined covert action as operations ‘so planned and executed 
that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthor-
ized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim 
any responsibility for them’.27 After covert action to influence the Italian 
elections that same year, plausible deniability, as Treverton put it, became 
‘dogma’.28 NSC5412, issued in March 1954, used the same language as NSC10/2 
and reaffirmed the importance of plausible deniability in larger anti-communist 
23 For an overview of the literature, see Vladimir Rauta, A theory of distributional violence: an analysis of proxy wars 
in Africa, 1945–2011, PhD diss., University of Nottingham, 2017. 
24 Andrew Mumford, Proxy warfare (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), pp. 3–4.
25 Geraint Hughes, My enemy’s enemy: proxy warfare in international politics (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2014), p. 
5; Kevin O’Brien, ‘Surrogate agents: private military and security operators in an unstable world’, in M. Innes, 
ed., Making sense of proxy wars: states, surrogates and the use of force (Washington DC: Potomac, 2013), pp. 109–36.
26 See Paul Maddrell, ‘What we have discovered about the Cold War is what we already knew: Julius Mader and 
the western secret services during the Cold War’, Cold War History 5: 2, 2005, pp. 235–58, and ‘British intel-
ligence through the eyes of the Stasi: what the Stasi’s records show about the operations of British intelligence 
in Cold War Germany’, Intelligence and National Security 27: 1, 2012, pp. 46–74. See also Raymond Garthoff, 
Soviet leaders and intelligence: assessing the American adversary during the Cold War (Washington DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2015).
27 Quoted in Treverton, Covert action, p. 36.
28 Treverton, Covert action, p. 73.
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covert actions.29 Accordingly, the early Cold War era became known as the ‘the 
age of plausible deniability’.30
Yet even at this early stage, the idea contained an element of self-delusion. The 
plausible deniability of the CIA’s most important Cold War covert actions was 
already questionable. The first book on the CIA, The cloak and dollar war, appeared 
as early as 1953 and offered a summary of its European covert action programme, 
including both failed attempts to roll back communism in eastern Europe and 
broader black propaganda operations. Indeed, even influence operations strug-
gled to maintain plausible deniability and, at the height of the Cold War, critics 
regularly pointed to black radio stations operated by both sides, covert publi-
cations and outright forgeries.31 In retrospect, and challenging orthodox under-
standings of covert action, these operations were apparent but not acknowledged: 
implausibly deniable. 
Exposure reached new heights with widespread press reporting of the prepara-
tions for the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961. Several mainstream American newspa-
pers discussed CIA training of Cuban exiles in camps in Florida and Guatemala. 
Plausible deniability was increasingly a collective delusion.32 The following 
years saw presidential plausible deniability fade away when, in the aftermath 
of major inquiries into the CIA, Congress stipulated that the President should 
report all covert actions through what became known as a presidential ‘finding’.33 
Meanwhile, numerous Cold War covert actions, such as those in Cambodia and 
Angola, were widely described and publicly debated in real time. 
During the following decade, the Reagan Doctrine elevated the impor-
tance of covert action, but also revelled in unsecrecy. Even on the election 
trail, Reagan promised the American public that he would ‘unleash’ the CIA. 
Delighted by the discomfort that the mujahideen were causing Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan, Reagan began to hint openly that America was aiding the resis-
tance forces there. Senators even engaged in proxy-war tourism along the 
Afghan–Pakistan border.34 The covert action in this theatre, known as ‘Opera-
tion Cyclone’, was implausibly deniable: decidedly apparent and, given the 
hints, barely unacknowledged. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, American directives continued to make dogmatic 
references to plausible deniability, but these remained confused and at odds with 
reality. Executive Order 12333, issued by Reagan in 1981, reiterated the idea that 
covert actions, referred to as special activities, ‘are planned and executed so that 
the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged 
publicly’.35 A decade later, the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence used 
29 Daugherty, Executive secrets, p. 135.
30 Radsan, ‘An overt turn on covert action’, p. 520.
31 Gordon Stewart, The cloak and dollar war (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1953), pp. 29, 50.
32 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘American journalism and the landscape of secrecy: Tad Szulc, the CIA and Cuba’, History 
100: 340, 2015, pp. 189–209.
33 Daugherty calls it the ‘practical death’ of plausible deniability: Executive secrets, p. 94. 
34 Steve Coll, Ghost wars: the secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden (New York: Penguin, 2004), p. 70.
35 Executive Order 12333—United States intelligence activities, 4 Dec. 1981, https://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12333.html (accessible on 18 March 2018).
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the same language, adding that the United States sought ‘a form of plausible denial 
to the outside world’.36 Officials, no less than academics, conflated secrecy with 
lack of acknowledgement by implying that plausible deniability involves action 
which is neither apparent nor acknowledged. These are two separate things; and 
covert action was, in fact, increasingly apparent, at times even a matter of display. 
America has not been alone in this. Many states engaging in covert action make 
use of plausible deniability as an organizing idea, but have used it more flexibly.37 
Although codifying less than the United States,38 the UK emphasized plausible 
deniability in the aftermath of the Second World War. By the mid-1960s, however, 
policy-makers had to distinguish between ‘untraceable’ and ‘deniable’ operations, 
when MI6 and special forces waged ‘secret’ wars in both Yemen and Indonesia, 
and denials rang hollow. Untraceable operations were those ‘in which the hand 
of HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] at best will not even be suspected and at 
worst cannot be proved’. These demonstrated traditional conceptualizations of 
covert action. Deniable operations were those in which ‘if, in spite of the proba-
bility that HMG connived [in] its execution and in spite of some tenable arguable 
evidence that HMG was officially involved, HMG considers it politically feasible 
to deny complicity in public statements e.g. in the House of Commons or the 
United Nations’.39 These, by contrast, were implausibly deniable. This formula-
tion—perhaps because it was not for public consumption—offers a more realistic 
account of deniability. In contrast to American understandings, the UK distin-
guished secrecy or visibility from acknowledgement and opened the way towards 
implausible deniability. It is telling that the literature discussed in the previous 
section of this article is overwhelmingly American and does not take account of 
the nuances visible in the UK historical record.
Russia also conceptualizes plausible deniability along a continuum in a manner 
that emphasizes degrees of secrecy and acknowledgement. As in the West, Russian 
(and earlier Soviet) covert action is ‘based on the principle of plausible deniability, 
where the result is to influence decision-making in a direction favourable or at 
least not harmful to the Kremlin’.40 In practice, however, the old Soviet idea of 
‘active measures’, its term for political warfare, was more complex than western 
equivalents. It offered a more holistic approach, adopted and implemented by a 
variety of institutions. Covert methods and actors overlapped with their overt 
counterparts, making them deliberately difficult to conceptualize and counter. 
This was particularly the case regarding propaganda, which drew on both covert 
and overt tools interchangeably and simultaneously.41 Now, Moscow’s active 
36 S. Rep. No. 102–85 (1991), p. 43.
37 See Len Scott, ‘Secret intelligence, covert action and clandestine diplomacy’, Intelligence and National Security 
19: 2, 2004, p. 327; Neville Wylie, ‘“The importance of being honest”: Switzerland, neutrality, and the prob-
lems of intelligence collection and liaison’, Intelligence and National Security 21: 5, 2006, p. 785.
38 Rory Cormac, ‘Disruption and deniable interventionism: explaining the appeal of covert action and special 
forces in contemporary British policy’, International Relations 31: 2, 2017, pp. 169–91.
39 UK Joint Action Committee, 1964, quoted in Cormac, Disrupt and deny, pp. 170–71.
40 Martin Kragh and Sebastian Asberg, ‘Russia’s strategy for influence through diplomacy and active measures: 
the Swedish case’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40: 6, 2017, p. 6.
41 Jeffrey Richelson, Sword and shield: Soviet intelligence and security apparatus (New York: Ballinger, 1986), pp. 137, 146.
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measures exploit the western commitment to pluralism and new forms of media 
to blur the line between secrecy and acknowledgement, truth and lie, fact and 
fiction.42 
The visibility of much covert action has increased in recent years, further eroding 
the utility of plausible deniability as traditionally understood. This trend is driven 
by wider factors within leaders’ control, such as the remarkable rise of special 
forces and private military companies (PMCs) since 9/11. The majority of special 
forces activity requires high levels of skill but is not especially covert: this applies 
to activities such as raiding, forward air control, hostage rescue and security sector 
reform. But other core special forces activities, including what the Pentagon terms 
‘Activities Specified by the President or SecDef [Defense Secretary]’, overlap with 
covert action. This latter kind of activity, which challenges the long-held US 
bureaucratic distinction between covert action and military special operations, was 
exemplified by a new style of counterterrorism adopted in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
fusing the rapid exploitation of intelligence gained from special forces raids with 
social network analysis. The information obtained thereby enabled further kinetic 
action on an almost industrial scale. The rise of special forces—operating in such 
numbers, in so many arenas, and in such close involvement with the intelligence 
services—makes plausible deniability difficult.43
Likewise, PMCs, although not new, transformed themselves into global corpo-
rations following 9/11 and the ensuing surge in demand for security that govern-
ments alone could not meet.44 Although originally perceived as conducting 
relatively mundane guard duties in Iraq and Afghanistan, PMCs soon expanded, 
hiring a number of senior CIA officers—to the extent that some regarded one 
company, Blackwater (now Xe/Academi), as ‘an extension of the agency’.45 
PMCs allegedly became involved in CIA or Pentagon programmes to track and 
kill militants,46 back-filled many traditional special forces roles in secondary 
locations such as Colombia,47 and worked alongside special forces and intel-
ligence officers in the emerging wars in Libya and Syria.48 The rise of PMCs, 
operating in a grey zone between the public and the private, further complicates 
issues of deniability.
42 Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing is true and everything is possible (London: Faber, 2015).
43 Richard H. Shultz, Jr, ‘US counterterrorism operations during the Iraq War: a case study of Task Force 714’, 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40: 10, 2017, pp. 809–37. See also Mark Urban, Task Force Black (London: Faber, 
2013).
44 For examples, see Christopher Kinsey, Corporate soldiers and international security: the rise of private military 
(London: Routledge, 2006); Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, Security beyond the state: private security 
in international politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Thomas Bruneau, Patriots for profit: 
contractors and the military in US national security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).
45 Erik Prince, Civilian warriors: the inside story of Blackwater (New York: Penguin, 2013), pp. 342–3.
46 Mark Mazzetti and Dexter Filkins, ‘Contractors tied to effort to track and kill militants’, New York Times, 14 
March 2010; James Risen and Mark Mazzetti, ‘Blackwater guards tied to secret CIA raids’, New York Times, 10 
Dec. 2009. For two journalistic accounts, see Robert Young Pelton, Licensed to kill: hired guns in the war on terror 
(New York: Crown, 2006); Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: the rise of the world’s most powerful mercenary army (New 
York: Nationbooks, 2007). 
47 Gerald Schumacher, A bloody business: America’s war zone contractors and the occupation of Iraq (St Paul, MN: 
Zenith, 2006), pp. 16–17.
48 Richard Norton-Taylor and Chris Stephen, ‘Libya: SAS veterans helping NATO identify Gaddafi targets in 
Misrata’, Guardian, 1 June 2011.
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Factors outside government decision-making processes also have an impact 
upon exposure; the most important is information and communications 
technology (ICT). Although active press reporting has always qualified the 
secrecy of military operations,49 recent changes in ICT have amplified vulner-
abilities for intelligence services and special forces alike. These include afford-
able, worldwide and real-time coverage; global internet access; and access to 
com mercial mapping and space imagery systems.50 ICT allows citizens to commu-
nicate, to collect evidence, and ultimately to compromise plausible deniability.51 
Meanwhile, state secrecy—and plausible deniability—is further challenged by a 
globalized civil society, with increased contact between legions of investigative 
journalists, human rights lawyers and whistleblowers. Claims about the ‘end of 
secrecy’ have been overstated, and governments are fighting back hard against 
journalists and whistleblowers;52 Barack Obama’s White House prosecuted twice 
as many whistleblowers under the 1917 Espionage Act as all previous presidents 
combined.53 Nevertheless, all of this has substantially challenged the ‘doctrine’ of 
plausible deniability—so much so that Dennis Blair, the US Director of National 
Intelligence in 2009–2010, dismissed it as a relic of the Cold War and irrelevant for 
twenty-first-century counterterrorism operations.54 
Changes in the media environment have important implications for under-
standing the nature of covert action; they go far beyond a mere diminution of 
secrecy and further demonstrate the spectrum of visibility and acknowledgement. 
Over the past 20 years we have seen a demassification—or fragmentation—of the 
media characterized not only by hundreds of new channels but also by informal 
reporting from bloggers. Meanwhile, military operations are increasingly accom-
panied by information operations in which claim competes with counterclaim 
to damage the credibility of any narrative.55 This has important implications 
for understanding plausible deniability, for it highlights confusion rather than 
secrecy. Ample evidence pointed to Russian military involvement in Ukraine, 
for example, but western journalistic methodology caused mainstream news 
outlets to report respectfully the flat denials of Moscow and pick up some of the 
commentary by private Russian-owned news outlets and thousands of patriotic 
Russian online bloggers.56 We must, of course, be wary of forgetting history here: 
the KGB advanced disinformation throughout the Cold War. It aimed not simply 
to defame the target, but to spread confusion which, in turn, would entice the 
49 James Randall, ‘The newspaper problem and its bearing upon military secrecy during the Civil War’,  American 
Historical Review 23: 2, 1918, pp. 303–23.
50 Chris Perkins and Martin Dodge, ‘Satellite imagery and the spectacle of secret spaces’, Geoforum 40: 4, 2009, 
pp. 546–60.
51 Joseph and Poznansky, ‘Media technology, covert action, and the politics of exposure’, p. 2.
52 Alasdair Roberts, ‘WikiLeaks: the illusion of transparency’, International Review of Administrative Sciences 78: 1, 
2012, pp. 116–33; Mark Fenster, ‘The opacity of transparency’, Iowa Law Review 91: 885, 2005, pp. 885–949.
53 Spencer Ackerman and Ed Pilkington, ‘Obama’s war on whistle-blowers leaves administration insiders 
unscathed’, Guardian, 16 March 2015.
54 Quoted in Kibbe, ‘Conducting shadow wars’, p. 392.
55 Paul Virilio, Desert screen: war at the speed of light (London: Athlone, 2002), p. 5.
56 Keir Giles, Russia’s ‘new’ tools for confronting the West: continuity and innovation in Moscow’s exercise of power, research 
paper (London: Chatham House, 2016), pp. 37–40.
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target to act in favour of Soviet interests.57 Recent ‘fake news’ follows in this tradi-
tion, but allows sponsors to sow even more confusion, given the fragmentation 
and proliferation of new media channels. Changes in the media landscape have not 
only made it harder to verify information; they have also prompted policy-makers 
to embrace the idea of implausible deniability, as we suggest below.
Deniability is thus a nuanced concept. Existing versions of plausible 
deniability—inherent in orthodox understandings of covert action—do not fare 
well when applied to known historical examples; nor do they stand up in the 
current strategic environment. Embracing the complexity of deniability within 
covert action, as we do here, suggests that there must be a reason—beyond self-
delusion—to explain why policy-makers returned to this option time and again. 
On the one hand, it does appear that the United States failed to think through the 
doctrine of secrecy in a particularly sophisticated manner. On the other hand, a 
more nuanced account of plausible deniability involving a spectrum of visibility 
and acknowledgement has important implications for understanding current and 
historical covert actions. It could be argued, for example, that early CIA operations 
in eastern Europe, visible to a particular audience, demonstrated resolve and kept 
the flame of hope alive among dissidents; that the Bay of Pigs operation, through 
its exposure, displayed dynamism to the American people; and that awareness 
of operations in Angola and Afghanistan conveyed key messages to audiences at 
home and abroad. We explore this aspect of the topic in detail in the next section. 
Embracing implausible deniability
During the Cold War, as we have suggested, plausible deniability was in fact widely 
recognized as implausible. Covert actions involving ‘secret armies’ of as many as 
40,000 people achieved only a pantomime secrecy. Nonetheless, leaders sometimes 
embrace, or even celebrate, implausible deniability. Costs of exposure should 
therefore not be taken at face value; they will not spell the end of covert action. On 
the contrary, implausible deniability has logic and political value. Special forces, 
covert action, and the modern transition of intelligence officers from gatherers to 
hunters,58 allow politicians to signal resolution and resilience when they choose. 
Tony Blair caught this mood perfectly in 2006 while addressing a press conference. 
When journalists asked him about MI6 activities in Moscow, he quipped: ‘We 
never comment on intelligence matters . . . except when we want to, obviously.’59 
His flippant aside disguises an important truth: that covert action as a grey activity 
can perform a wider range of functions than genuinely secret operations. 
It is overly simplistic to think of covert action merely in terms of hidden 
sponsorship. In reality, covert action, as we have seen, involves multiple levels of 
exposure and multiple audiences. Allies, adversaries and domestic audiences may 
57 Herbert Romerstein, ‘Disinformation as a KGB weapon in the Cold War’, Journal of Intelligence History 1: 1, 
2001, pp. 54–67.
58 Charles Cogan, ‘Hunters not gatherers: intelligence in the twenty-first century’, Intelligence and National 
 Security 19: 2, 2004, pp. 304–21.
59 M. Oliver, ‘Blair avoids questions over British spy ring’, Guardian, 23 Jan. 2006.
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well be aware that a state is engaging in operations, creating a unique form of 
dramatic irony. Covert action might even be thought of as a kind of secret theatre 
that can be used to communicate or create uncertainty.60 Implausible deniability 
allows states to communicate resolve, while not escalating crises into open 
warfare.61 It conveys messages, picked up via counter-intelligence apparatuses, 
about intentions to other leaders.62 There are numerous examples of such behav-
iour in recent history. In the mid-1960s, Britain launched covert actions against 
Egyptian interests in Yemen and against Indonesia. Both cases were visible to the 
targets; indeed, President Nasser of Egypt even sent those heading the Yemen 
operation a Christmas card. It was not always successful, however. Communica-
tion within the Indonesian Army was so poor that SAS raids did not achieve the 
signalling or deterrence effects intended.63 Like deception and deterrence, covert 
action has communicative value only if the target can both see and understand it.64 
In 1969, the United States used ‘secret’ bombing in Cambodia to signal resolve 
to local leaders. The following decade in Angola both superpowers employed 
covert aid primarily to signal resolve to local allies and each other, measuring 
commitment from observed changes in the magnitude of their opponent’s aid. 
Likewise, western aid to the mujahideen in Afghanistan was intended to convey 
resolve.65 Accordingly, Lord Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary, refused to 
deny that MI6 was sending arms to Afghanistan because doing so would ‘remove 
an incentive on the Soviet Union to look for a political solution and lay ourselves 
open to domestic criticism for being unwilling to back our words with deeds’.66 
Britain therefore found itself in the seemingly odd position of unofficially hinting 
at more aggressive levels of covert action than were actually taking place. 
Implausible deniability—or open secrecy—prevented escalation during the 
Cold War: parties had a shared interest in maintaining the fiction of secrecy in 
order to avoid pressure to escalate. Such ‘tacit collusion’ managed risk and offered 
a way out of tense situations67—which was of considerable importance, given 
the nuclear dimension of the superpower standoff. However, as demonstrated 
above, a similar logic applied when using covert action against non-nuclear and 
non-aligned states. It still holds in the post-Cold War world, suggesting a lack of 
strategic transformation and the advisability of caution in calculating the role of 
nuclear weapons in determining the place of covert action within a state’s grand 
strategy. In 2007, Israel launched a ‘covert’ strike on a suspected Syrian nuclear 
60 There are parallels with Augusto Baol’s idea of ‘invisible theatre’: see M. M. Kohtes, ‘Invisible theatre: reflec-
tions on an overlooked form’, New Theatre Quarterly 9: 33, 1993, pp. 85–9.
61 See Carson, ‘Facing off and saving face’, pp. 103–31.
62 Carson and Yarhi-Milo, ‘Covert communication’, pp. 132, 133–4. 
63 On Yemen, see Clive Jones, Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962–1965 (Brighton: Sussex University Press, 2004); 
on Indonesia, see Christopher Tuck, ‘“Cut the bonds which bind our hands’: deniable operations during the 
confrontation with Indonesia’, British Journal of Military History 77: 2, 2013, pp. 599–623, and ‘The limits of covert 
action: SAS operations during “Confrontation”, 1964–66’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 27: 6, 2016, pp. 996–1018.
64 Scott D. Sagan and Jeremi Suri, ‘The Madman nuclear alert: secrecy, signaling, and safety in October 1969’, 
International Security 27: 4, 2003, pp. 150–83.
65 On these examples, see Carson and Yarhi-Milo, ‘Covert communication’, pp. 125, 126, 140, 153.
66 FCO 37/2216, Fenn to Acland, 30 June 1980, National Archives, Kew.
67 See Carson, ‘Facing off and saving face’, pp. 103–31.
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reactor to demonstrate resolve to other nuclear proliferators in the region, namely 
Iran. Crucially, the deterrent value depended on Israeli denials being  implausible.68 
More recently, building on Carson’s work on non-escalation, Russian activity in 
Ukraine signals to the United States and its allies that while Moscow will pursue 
its interests, it will do so not through direct conflict, but through more limited 
means, thereby circumscribing the nature of competition.69 More recently still, 
in February 2018, non-acknowledgement helped defuse a potential crisis when 
dozens of Russians died fighting US-backed forces in Syria.70
Remarkably, secrecy and special forces have become a sort of performative 
spectacle. Premiers love to associate themselves with special forces because it makes 
them look tough. On 24 February 2013, Michelle Obama announced the winner of 
the Academy Award for Best Motion Picture of 2012 while surrounded by people in 
uniform. Two of the top contenders featured the CIA and covert action. The award 
went to Argo, with Zero Dark Thirty a close runner-up. Both films claimed to feature 
true stories and to be focused on narrating real events. Both received govern-
ment support, including access to CIA and special forces officials, together with 
reams of specially declassified intelligence documents.71 With policy elites inside 
the Pentagon and the CIA treating elaborate secrecy as an ostentatious display of 
importance,72 the CIA and special forces are now celebrated in America as super-
patriots, rather in the way that the KGB and its successors are praised as macho 
defenders of Russia.73 Intelligence and special forces perform a Janus-like function, 
signalling resolve to domestic audiences, yet appeasing a war-weary public opposed 
to conventional ‘boots on the ground’ in difficult locations. 
Performative posturing using intelligence and special forces creates ambiguity 
as much as it shows resolve. It proudly demonstrates the existence of these virile 
capabilities without specifying when and where they are being used. This twilight 
zone is useful: many states, in practice, have long preferred ambiguity over 
deniability. The CIA neither confirms nor denies its activities. Likewise, British 
ministers neither confirm nor deny intelligence and special forces activity, while 
Israel operates a deliberate ‘policy of ambiguity’. As Alexandra Perina, Attorney 
Advisor to the State Department in 2013–2014, explained, denials recast the ‘neither 
confirm nor deny’ principle from a ‘position of inscrutability which maintains 
factual neutrality to one imbued, if ever so slightly, with affirmation’.74 Many 
covert actions, rather than being denied outright—and plausibly—as orthodoxy 
would have it, therefore instead turn on non-acknowledgement. Acknowledge-
ment and denial exist at the ends of a continuum, not as binary absolutes.
68 Carson and Yarhi-Milo, ‘Covert communication’, p. 133.
69 Carson, ‘Facing off and saving face’, pp. 103–31.
70 Austin Carson, ‘Russia and the US just diffused a potential crisis in Syria—and showed us how to back 
away from a war’, Washington Post, 20 Feb. 2018.
71 Timothy Melley, ‘Covert spectacles and the contradictions of the democratic security state’, Storyworlds: A 
Journal of Narrative Studies 6: 1, 2014, pp. 61–82. See also Liam Kennedy, ‘The elusive enemy: Zero Dark Thirty 
and the American worldview’, Journal of American Studies 51: 3, 2017, pp. 965–80.
72 Scott Horton, Lords of secrecy: the national security elite and America’s stealth warfare (New York: Avalon, 2016).
73 Valerie Sperling, Sex, politics, and Putin: political legitimacy in Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
74 Alexandra Perina, ‘Black holes and open secrets: the impact of covert action on international law’, Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 53: 3, 2015, p. 545.
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Hybrid warfare forms a timely example of implausibly deniable operations 
creating exploitable ambiguity. The approach, developed in the United States but 
now associated with Russia,75 combines political and military activity with covert 
action, especially influence operations. Its aim, according to one Russia specialist, 
is ‘to generate a situation where it is unclear whether a state of war exists—and if it 
does, who is a combatant and who is not’.76 In short, it creates ambiguity. Russian 
activities in Ukraine, especially in the eastern Donbas region, form the most 
recent prominent example. Scholars have labelled them ‘implausibly’ deniable and 
compared them to Soviet operations against Poland in the 1920s: ‘sufficient to keep 
the wound bleeding but insufficient, thus far, to warrant massive retaliation’.77 
Intervention in Ukraine displayed many of the factors associated with twenty-
first-century implausible deniability discussed above. Ultra-nationalist Russian 
agitators seem to have moved into Ukraine to intensify the local grievances of 
ethnic Russians and to create disturbances. The inevitable Ukrainian response was 
then used to justify the intervention of irregular forces consisting of pan-Slavic 
Russian ‘patriots’, privateers and mercenaries, supplied and advised by Russian 
intelligence services and special operations forces. Under Russian supervision, the 
rebel units focused on radio stations and communications facilities in an attempt 
to shape the narrative, seeking to frame events as a humanitarian crisis that could 
be blamed on Kiev. All the while, Moscow denied any involvement.78
Moving beyond hybrid warfare to political influence operations, a former 
senior MI6 officer described Russian covert action targeting the 2016 US presi-
dential election as equally ‘implausibly deniable’. This operation aimed to reduce 
the credibility of the American election system, using tried and tested practices 
that date from the Soviet era, yet are now more sophisticated, especially when 
combined with advances in communications technology, overt propaganda and 
attempts to work through institutions such as the OSCE or the UN.79 The 
attack on a Russian military intelligence officer turned MI6 spy, Sergei Skripal, 
in England in February 2018, using Russian-made military grade nerve agents, 
also fits into this pattern. Here again, despite widespread accusations, the Kremlin 
denies sponsorship.
The ambiguity created by implausible deniability is useful for a variety of 
reasons. First, implausible deniability opens up a gap in the decision-making of 
cumbersome institutions like NATO that Russia can exploit. Russia is highly 
unlikely to expand into the Baltic states, so it is important not to overstate the 
case here, but the Kremlin certainly welcomes disunity within NATO, and the 
75 On the US origins, see Frank G. Hoffman and James N. Mattis, ‘Future warfare: the rise of hybrid wars’, Naval 
Institute Proceedings 132: 11, 2005, pp. 18–19; Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st century: the rise of hybrid wars 
(Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Army Studies, 2007).
76 Thornton, ‘The changing nature of modern warfare’, pp. 41–2.
77 Jonathan Haslam, Near and distant neighbours: a new history of Soviet intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), pp. 278–9.
78 Galeotti, ‘Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear?’, pp. 282–301; Andrew Monaghan, ‘The “war” in Russia’s 
hybrid warfare’, Parameters 45: 4, 2015, p. 65. It should be noted that Putin did eventually admit Russian 
involvement after the operations had ended, although he differentiated between regular soldiers and covert 
operatives. Thanks to Bettina Renz for pointing this out. 
79 Private information.
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Baltic states do face a complex array of pressures from their east.80 Exposure of 
Russian action, combined with non-acknowledgement of that action by Moscow, 
allows the Kremlin to test NATO responses and raise questions about the utility 
of Article 5—as demonstrated by cyber attacks and information operations against 
Estonia and Latvia over the past decade.81 Unacknowledged exposure blurs the 
lines between internal disorder and external intervention, state and non-state 
activity, making it difficult for the international community to differentiate 
between legitimate and illegitimate behaviour. Thomas Schelling’s logic of ‘salami 
slicing’ also applies here. This is dangerous as, through small individual gains, it 
turns on testing the resolve of one’s rival.82 
Second, ambiguity and implausible deniability allow the construction of 
powerful narratives. Knowledge of Russian activity—without acknowledge-
ment—allows the Kremlin to cultivate an image of omnipotence. NATO, 
and western commentators more broadly, see Russian subversion behind 
every gooseberry bush and fear that Putin is already waging hybrid warfare 
against eastern Europe, if not the whole of NATO. As Bettina Renz puts it, 
‘the portrayal of Western weakness in the face of superior Russian “hybrid 
warfare” capabilities has played directly into Putin’s hands’. The fear of hybrid 
warfare, as operating in permanent support of some supposedly clearly defined 
foreign policy goal, perpetuates the idea of a powerful Kremlin needing to 
be countered.83 Ambiguity creates space for myths to emerge and allows fear 
to take hold. Non-acknowledged exposure is the crucial ingredient enabling 
this narrative. Western journalistic methodologies seem to struggle with the 
fragmented media and its implication for disinformation and so-called ‘fake 
news’. Competing narratives and a gradual approach which blurs the line 
between legitimate and illegitimate action mean that by the time target states 
are in a position to retaliate or investigate, the damage has been done.84 Yet 
some deniability—even in the face of growing evidence—remains important. 
Overt acknowledgement would invite condemnation, escalation and retaliation 
by the international community.85
Meanwhile, unofficial narratives, enabled by implausible deniability, aimed 
at domestic audiences are also useful. Governments have a variety of tools at 
their disposal, including leaks and plants, by which to transfer knowledge into 
80 See Matthew Rojansky, ‘Prepared testimony for US House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee 
on Europe, Eurasia and Emerging Threats hearing on “US policy toward the Baltic states”’, 22 March 2017, 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20170322/105756/HHRG-115-FA14-Wstate-RojanskyM-20170322.
pdf (accessible on 22 March 2018). 
81 Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘Cyber attacks, self defence, and the problem of attribution’, Journal of Conflict and 
 Security Law 17: 2, 2012, pp. 229–44.
82 Thomas Schelling, Arms and influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 66. Thanks to Michael 
Poznansky for pointing this out.
83 Renz, ‘Russia and “hybrid warfare”’, p. 284.
84 Britain’s oversight body, the Intelligence and Security Committee, only announced investigation into Russian 
activity in late 2017: ISC, press release, 23 Nov. 2017, http://isc.independent.gov.uk/news-archive/ 23novem 
ber2017 (accessible on 22 March 2018). Likewise, Obama knew about Russian activities before the 2016 election 
but because of various political factors and swirling narratives felt unable to respond. See Emmarie Huetteman, 
‘Obama White House knew of Russian election hacking but delayed telling’, New York Times, 21 June 2017.
85 Thornton, ‘The changing nature of modern warfare’, p. 44.
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the public domain without officially acknowledging something.86 Recent CIA 
activities in Yemen underline this. Multiple press stories revealed the classified 
drone programme in a controlled way, largely as a result of information planted 
by unnamed US officials. The plants, probably authorized by the White House, 
kept the American people minimally informed and characterized the operations 
in a manner designed to boost support without compromising security. They also 
signalled respect for local sovereignty by noting Yemeni consent, without formally 
acknowledging Yemeni involvement and so technically not violating the pledge to 
keep it hidden. Domestic watchdog groups struggled to secure additional details 
about internal procedures, collateral damage estimates and legal viewpoints.87 
Ambiguity thus has value at the domestic as well as the international level.
Conclusions 
Implausible deniability, even pantomime secrecy, are not new. Some of America’s 
larger paramilitary Cold War covert actions were so ostentatious that they could 
barely be disguised at all. Despite official denials, audiences were well aware of the 
hidden hand and to whom it belonged. Now ‘special activities’ is a massive enter-
prise with both a public and a privatized face. America’s Joint Special Operations 
Command boasts close to 100,000 personnel and its own Special Forces University 
located in Florida, together with an academic journal. Yet despite this panoply of 
activity, the United States does not seem to have thought through the doctrinal 
issue of unsecrecy. Some have criticized the expansion of special forces as the 
uncritical elevation of tactic to strategy, merely focused on an unending global 
game of ‘whack-a-mole’ that is not fully integrated into wider policy.88 
By contrast, others have devoted more thought to implausible deniability. The 
UK, as demonstrated above, historically differentiated between untraceable and 
deniable covert actions, while much current activity takes place within a deliber-
ately broad framework, thereby circumventing the more rigid ‘neither apparent 
nor acknowledged’ approach of the United States. Russia has a longer tradition 
of thinking about unsecrecy. As Galeotti reminds us: ‘From the tsars through the 
Bolsheviks, they have been accustomed to a style of warfare that embraces much 
more eagerly the irregular and the criminal, the spook and the provocateur, the 
activist and the fellow-traveller.’89 During the Cold War, the Soviet Union used 
overt and covert propaganda simultaneously, and did so alongside subversion and 
other more overt forms of intervention. Likewise, the Kremlin recognized the 
positive gains to be derived from exposure (as opposed to acknowledgement). 
They deemed forgeries, a speciality of the KGB, successful even if exposed. If 
the Americans could convince a foreign leader that a particular document was a 
forgery, then, the Kremlin hoped, that forgery would serve to remind the leader 
86 Perina, ‘Black holes and open secrets’, p. 543.
87 David Pozen, ‘The leaky Leviathan: why the government condemns and condones unlawful disclosures of 
information’, Harvard Law Review 127: 512, 2013, p. 560.
88 Linda Robinson, ‘The future of special operations: beyond kill and capture’, Foreign Affairs 91: 6, 2012, pp.  110–12.
89 Galeotti, ‘Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear?’, p. 296.
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of similar American activities in the past—or simply create fear and uncertainty 
about the present.90
This article has sought to problematize the concept of plausible deniability. We 
conclude that, in reality, covert action is less about plausible deniability and more 
about non-acknowledged intervention as performance. It is misleading to assume 
that successful covert action necessitates that the sponsoring hand remain hidden 
long after the act. Some scholars predict the demise of covert action, largely 
because increased exposure, caused by changes in the media and communica-
tions technology, erodes plausible deniability.91 But this view rests on an assump-
tion, challenged here, that robust plausible deniability was a key part of Cold 
War operations. Covert action is broader than current conceptions of plausible 
deniability allow. There may well be cases of covert action yet to come to light 
which are plausibly deniable; but, even so, our key point still stands. A spectrum 
of visibility and deniability exists; the one constant is non-acknowledgement.
Building on this, we asked why, despite this lack of plausibility, leaders 
continue to use such actions, and how these developments connect to discussions 
about hybrid warfare. We conclude that implausible deniability does not spell the 
end of covert action. The grey zone between secrecy and exposure brings signifi-
cant benefits. It has communicative value and allows states to demonstrate resolve 
without escalating to military conflict. In an era of new nationalism, it also injects 
calculated uncertainty into relations between states, creating fear abroad and 
yielding electoral dividends at home.92 This has clear relevance to debates about 
hybrid warfare, and we seek to put the intelligence literature into dialogue with 
strategic studies, suggesting not only that hybrid warfare is not especially new, but 
that understanding covert action is integral to understanding this wider form of 
interventionism. This is the future. It is not only Russia that is using implausible 
deniability as a way of acting with impunity. The Russians believe the Americans 
have done the same in the post-Soviet space. Meanwhile, the US military has also 
pointed to China and Iran as using similarly ambiguous approaches.93
Yet there are potential costs and hazards. As two venerable national security 
lawyers have observed, practitioners can mask imperfect secrecy by generating a 
vast background noise about plots and conspiracies in order to create a surfeit of 
information. The problem for the adversary is trying to identify which ones are 
serious, since countering all contingencies is impossibly costly. But this, in turn, 
creates issues for the perpetrator regarding loss of control. Such ambiguity and 
swirl of rumour has the short-term tactical effect of lending an advantage, but 
in the longer term could increase tension and the general possibility of conflict.94 
Under conditions of implausible deniability, covert actions are less of a precision 
instrument and may have more unintended consequences.
90 Richelson, Sword and shield, p. 139.
91 Joseph and Poznansky, ‘Media technology, covert action, and the politics of exposure’; John Prados, ‘The future 
of covert action’, in L. Johnson, ed., Handbook of Intelligence Studies (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 289–90.
92 Perina, ‘Black holes and open secrets’, p. 519.
93 United States Army Special Operations Command, SOF support to political warfare, white paper, 10 March 2015, 
repr. in Lovelace, ed., Hybrid warfare and the gray zone threat, pp. 159–200.
94 Michael Reisman and James Baker, Regulating covert action (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), p.  14.
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Writers from a post-colonial perspective have frequently commented that 
covert action has contributed to a ‘paranoid style’ in the domestic politics of the 
Middle East and South Asia.95 One veteran privateer recalls that as the insurgency 
in Iraq gathered pace, rumours abounded that ‘the CIA was flying in Afghan 
fighters and Saudi suicide bombers to punish the Iraqis and make them look bad 
to the outside world’. It was widely believed that the CIA had paid looters to steal 
hospital equipment which was being shipped to Israel.96 Implausible deniability 
will only make this phenomenon worse, and the end result is blowback. Like illicit 
light weapons or computer viruses, covert actions are merely an instrument, but 
once released into the world they are hard to control. Their endless proliferation 
is not an unqualified good.
95 Huma Yusuf, ‘Conspiracy fever: the US, Pakistan and its media’, Survival 53: 4, 2011, pp. 95–118; Humeira Iqti-
dar, ‘Conspiracy theory as political imaginary: Blackwater in Pakistan’, Political Studies 64: 1, 2016, pp.  200–15.
96 James Ashcroft, Making a killing: the explosive story of a hired gun in Iraq (London: Virgin, 2006), pp. 206–207.
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